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PERPETUI

TIES

.

The term perpetuity is applied to an illegal suspension of the power of alienation, or to grants of property wherein the vesting of an estate or interest is
unlawfully postponed.

The doctrine of perpetuities, as it

is called, is one of the most intricate and unsettled
branches of the law.

It is a cantena of judicial decis-

ions upon the many attempts to so convey property that persons may have the beneficial enjoyment of it without being
able to convey it away, or subject it to the claims of
their creditors.
These attempts have been ingenious and subtl9 but
the courts, and in modern times,the Legislature, have been
prompt to detect and to defeat all such attempts, and to
allow the power of alienation to be suspended only for a
limited period.

Nevertheless, even in recent times,

scarcely a case involving the construction of a will
arises for judicial determination, in which the question of

illegal suspension is not involved; and it is often difficult to tell when the power of alienation is suspended.
In the Duke of Norfolk's Case,
the judge said:-

( 3 Ch. Cases, 19)

"The power of alienation is suspended,

where, though all who have interest should join in the
conveyance, yet they could not bar or pass the estate.'
This definition has been substantially adopted in the Revised Statutes.
The attempt by the great Nobles and Lords of early
Englandto have their lands descend to their heirs, uninterrupted by and regardless of the rights of the Crown,
and of creditors and others, and the resistance of this
attempt by the courts, is an interesting conflict in the
study of this subject. The first attempt was by a limitation , whereby a fee was restrained to some particular
heirs of a person
to create

exclusive of others.

But this attempt

a perpetuity was immediately thwarted by the

judges, who by a subtle line of reasoningheld that such a
gift was

a gift upon condition;

that it

should

the donor, if the donee had no heirs of his body.

revert to
They,

therefore, called it a fee simple on conditiontthat he
had issue; and observed that when any condition was performed, it was thenceforth entirely gong and the thing to

which it was before annexed became absolute, and wholly
unconditional, so that when the grantee had issue, his estate was supposed to become absolute by the performance

of

the condition, and he might then alien his land, and , therefore the power of alienation was suspended only during the
life of one person in being at the longest.
The next

attempt was by act of Parliament, the
the Second,

( commonly called the

statute

of Westrinister

statute

'de donis conditionabilis') which paid a greater r--

gard to the will and to the intentions of the donor
to the propriety of such intentions,

and enacted that

from thenceforth the will of the donor be observed;
that the tenements so given

than

and

( to a man and the heirs of

his body) should at all events go to the issue if there
were any; or if none, should revert to the donor.
M.Iany and great inconveniences arose because of the
suspension of the power of alienation allowed by this statute.

Bacon, Coke and Littleton have condemned the acl,

and declared that the true policy of the conmion law was
thereby overthrown; but the people were powerless to
effect an appeal, and the judges, while abhoring the perpetuity thus created, were incapable of devising any subterfuge, and about two centuries later in the reign of

Edward 1V.

( Taltarums case Co. Litt. 19b ) by a bold and

unexampled stretch of the power of judicial legislation,
the judges openly declared the application of a common reto
covery to be a sufficient bar~an estate tail, and their
determined attacks soon rendered the statute null e The
wise policy and foresight of the early judges in preventall such attempts is borne out even at the present day.

Estates tail were introduced in this country with
the other parts of the English jurisprudence; and Kent
states that they subsisted in full force before our Revolution, subject equally to the power of being barred by a
fine or a common recovery.

In New York estates tail were

abolished by statute as early as 1782.
The history of executory devises presents an interesting view of the stable policy of the cox,,non law judges
who abhorred perpetuities. The statute of entails having
been evaded by means of common recoveries,;

and provisions

and conditions not to alien, with a cesser of the estate
on any such attempt by the tenant, having been declared
invalid as a means to recall perpetuities; the judges looked upon executory limitations as a resort to attain the
same object, and they were permitted with great caution.
In the case of Pells v. Brown,

( Cro. Jac. 590.) an

executory devise of the fee upon a contingency not exceeding one life was allowec,,and it was held that it
not

could

be barred by a recovery, but was silent as to execuThe limits of an executory

tory bequests of chattels.

devise were gradually enlarged, however, and extended to
any number of lives in being; then to any number of lives
in being and the period of gestation to reach a
mous child;

posthu-

and lastly the doctrine was finplly settled

and determined by precise

limits

and the period

of

twenty one years to lives in being, and the period of gestation was held allowable and also applicable to a chattel
intlerest.
The rule against perpetuities
creation of remainders.

did not apply to the

The onljr ioestriction imposed upon

the limitation of a contingent remainder at comnon law

is

that there can be no limitation to the unborn child of
an unborn person.

A contingent remainder could at any tini.

be destroyed by the tenant of the particular estate by a
finz

or recovery in case of an estate tail, or by feoff-

ment or fine in the case of an estate for life;

and there-

fore the poi-er of alienation was not suspended according
to the weight of authority.
By the rules of the ancient conmon law there could

created
be no future property to take place in expectancy,
in personal goods and chattels, because it was thought
that personal property was of &oo transitory a nature,

and

liable to loss and destruction , and also that the exigenit
cy of trade required its free circulation, as otherwise
would put a stop to the freedom of gominerce.

But an ex-

ception was made in the case of last wills and testaments;
for a man might by testamentary gift give the use of personal property to a man for life, and after his death to
a third person absolutely.
disregarded,

But later this distinction was

and a person might create such a remainder

by either deed or will.

where an estate tail

in

things

personal was given to the first,or any subsequent possessor
it vests in-him the total property,and no remainder over
was permitted on such a limitation; for the judges were
ever watchful of an attempt to suspend the power
alienation,

of

and condemned this as tending to a perpetuity

as the devisee or grantee in tail of a chattel has no
method of barring the entail,
in

and therefore the law vested

him at once the entire dominion of the goods.
The rules against perpetuities put,

limit upon the postponement
but it

did no more,

as we see, a

of the vesting of property;

therefore,

it

was competent for a

testator to create a trust for the accumulation of the
income of properyfor the full period of any namber of
lives in beingand twenty one years thereafter, as was done
in the celebrated case of Thelluson v. Woodford, ( 4 Vessey
247 ) Here the will of Thelluson arose for construction
He had devised the bulk of his imnense property to trustees for the purpose of accumulation during the lived of
his three sons

,

and of all their sons who should be living

at the time of his death, or be born in due time afterwards, and during the life of the suvivor of them, and
upon t he death of this last to go,to the eldest male lin.
eal descendant of his three sons etc..

The court held that

this will was valid under the rules applicable to executory devises.

This decision occasioned the passage of a

statute( 39 & 40 Geo. lll.)prohibiting any settlement of
property

for accumulation of property for any longer term

than thu life of the settler and

the period of twenty one

years from his death; or the minority of any living
en ventre sa mere at the time of his death;
ity o'

, or

or the minor-

any person who would be beneficially entitled to

the profits

under the settlement

if

of full

age.

Other schemes to create perpetuities were devised,
as by an executor: trust

"1irecting estates for life to

unborn children, to be so constituted as to make them tenants for life,

in

and to let

ers;1 Humberston v. id.

the issue to take as purchas-

1 P. Will. 322.)

and by a power

of revocation, to be excercised upon the birth of each ten
ant in

v. Duke of M., 5 Bro. P. C. 592.)
attempts

settlement;

strict

and to substitute

tail,

(Spencer

These and many other

to numerous to mention arose for judicial inves-

k

tigation and were crushed by the judges.
The only case in which a perpetuity could be successfully created at comon law was by establishing
trust for a charitable purpose.

Such trusts,

a

if they did

not originate in the statute of 43 Elizabeth, were at
least assured and regulated by it.
they do tend to a pecpetuity,

These trusts

are allow7able

in

, althoujh

England;*

the present day.
Having shown the application and extent of the rule
against perpetuities at common law, I will now examine the
present New York law upon this subject. In New York the
rule against the suspension of the power of alienation is
more stringent than at common law or in most of the States.
The general fundamental rule in regard to real estate is, that the absolute power of alienation shall not
be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever for

a longer period

than

during the continuance of not

moru than two lives inbeing at the creation of the estate,
with one exception ; where a contingent remainder infee
may be created on a prior remainder in fee
to take effect in the event that the persons to whom the
first remainder is limited shall die under the age of
twenty one ,or upon any other contingency by which the
estate of such persons may be determined before they
attain their full age.

A suspension of the absolute

power of alienation for a certain term not measured by
lives however short is void

,

as until my youngest daugh-

ter is twenty five , or for three years . But it was held
in Benedict v.
for a

Webb ,

( 98

N.Y.,

460.) that a suspension

minority is a suspension for one statuory life.
The absolute power of alienation is

suspended

where there are no persons in being by whom an absolute
fee in possession can be conveyed; that is , there must
be

:persons in being who by

combining the several

estates , rights, interests or contingencies that

they

represent can, if they all wish to, patch together an
absolute fee.

Whenever any future estate , right,

intere-

st or possibility can be released and thus extinguished,
its existance does not operate to suspend the absolute
power of alienation

; but the statute is

not aimed at a

case where a person is incapable of alienating because of
infancy,

lunacy etc.
In

contingent estates,where

to the persons who are to take,

the uncertainty is

there is

obviously

as

a sus-

pension of the power of alienation; but where tie uncertain
ty is as to the event and the personswho

if

the contin-

gency happens Will take are in esse and ascertainable the
estate is alienable, for these persons, and the owner of
the particular estate may comvey to a common grantee who
would receice an absolute fee .

As for instance if an

estatebe givento A for life with renainder to

"

in fee pro-

vided he has children living at 6's death, but if he does
not then to C . Here there is a contingent remainder in R
depending on an uncertainty

as to, an event yet the abso-

lute power of alienation is not suspended as B and f"may
assign their interest to
lute fee.

The court

A,

who may then convey an abso-

, however, are careless in constantly

stating that where the future estate is contingent the pow
er of alienation is suspended, which is not correct in every
case as has been shown, nevertheless they apply the real
test of alienability above given to the facts of each case
as it arises without consi ering whether it is contingent
or not and no harm is done.

The delivery of the grant, where an expectant estate is created by grant, and where it is created by devise
the death of the testator, is deemed the

time of the crea-

tion of the estate; and the instrument creating the estate
must be drawn, so that the suspension must inevitably terminate within the statutory period.

It is not enough that

the provisions of a given instrument are such that the suspension may terminate within the requirements

of the stat-

Moreover, i f the terms are such as to indicate a

ute.

suspension for more than two lives in being, still,

if

under all of the circumstances of the case, the absolute
fee must become alienable within two lives in being, it
valid.

is

As for instance, where a testator devised certain

land to his wife, arid her heirs
t6

rents and profits

in trust, to receive the

apply them to the use of,

or pay to,

each of his seven children, in equal portions, during their
respective lives. In this case there would seem to be an
unlawful suspension, but there is riot;
cestui
ing
in

because, if the

que trust survive the trustee, the whole estate be-

inalienable
the cestui

que

during her life,
trust

on her death must vest

by descent as her heirs at

and as a person cannot be

trustee

for himself,

law

the trust

must then cease.
alienable
The

A merger results, and the estate is

in-

only during her life.
exception

to the rule,that

the power of alien-

ation shall not be suspended for more than two lives in
needs
being, is simple and/little explanation. It applies to
cases
allAwhere there is allready a remainder in fee, limited to
an infant or person not in being,

arid it

says,

in

effect,

that regardless of.whether that remainder may itself continue contingenttill the end of the

two lives or riot,

in

either case a future and contingent remainder may be limited to vest, in case of the termination of the prior remain
der in fee during the minority of its owner.
In the case of all other contingent remainders, it
is necessary , under the provisions regulating the creation of remainders, that they must vest in interest during
the

continuance of nct more than two lives in being. The

term vested in interest is a wider

term than absolute

alienability, ard indicates a present fixed right of future
enj oyment.
Where land is given in undivided shares to two or

more persons as tenants in common for life, with cross remainders, they constitute successive estates

fur life

and consequently

there can be under the statute

but two

life estates in all, as to each parcel or share.
where

there

life,

with cross remainders,

to C for life

is

a gift

to A and B as
and after

tenants in

Thus

common for

the death of both

, and then with a remainder in fee

to such

children as C might leave: one of the shares is void, both
as

to the remainder for life toC and the remainder over;

but it cannot be ascertained which one it is until
death of A or B.

If

A and B had been joint

like remainder, it would have been valid;

the

tenants with a
as

there is no

such thing as a remainder among joint tenants, for each is
in legal contemplation at all times seized of the entire
estate.
The statutory period allowed for suspension of absolute ownership of personal property is in all cases two
lives

in being.

In all other respects limitations of fu-

ture contingent interests in personal property are governed
by the rules prescribed in relation to future estates in
land.

But while real property must become absolutely

alienable, the provisions in regard to personalty require
vesting in beneficial owners.

So long as the right to per-

sonal property remains contingent, the ownership cannot be

said to be absolute;

as soon, however,

as

it vests abso-

lutely, suspension of the absolute ownership ceases.
Where personal property is given by will, or otherwise, with restrictions which delay merely the right to
possession, the absolu te ownership is not suspended: as
where a fund is given to A for life, with remainder to B,
C and D in
ten years

equal
after

shares

to be paid them by the executors

A's death,

the

interest

to be paid to them

in the mean time. The property vests in them as a present
gift.

The right

of the executor or trustee

to retain

it

is

regarded as a power which does riot interfere with vesting the
absolute ownership, or with the owners free right to assign
or release.

But where a present gift

is

not intended,

the

vesting is postponed: as where a will provides for a
future division among the persons who shall then answer the
a given description.

The question in each case is,

did

the testator intend a present gift? and if he did riot,

the

vesting must take place within two lives in being.
The law against

the suspension

of alienationof real

or personal property is applicable to ever

species of

conveyance and limitation: whether it be by deed or will;
whether limited by an executory devise, or a springing

use

, or for a charitable purpose;ad whether in the

form

of a power in trust, or of a legal express trust.
In determining whether the power of alienation is
suspended, where a trust is created , the same rules which
have been heretofore considered.

In New York express trust

cart only be created for such purposes as are allowable by
statute.

Under the first two sections of the provisions

of the Revised Statutes specifying such purpose,they may
be created:

to sell lands for the benefit of creditors,

and to sell, mortgage or lease lands for the benefit of
legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any charge
In such trusts where the direction is to sell

thereon *

the land, there is obviously no suspension of the power of
alienation;
created

as the only purpose

for which they could be

would necessitate an immediate sale.

the direction is to mortgage or lease lands,
clear;

But where
it is not so

and it is sometimes difficult to tell whether the

trust comes under the second or third section. if it comes
under the second, the interest of the beneficiary is
assign ablq and the power of alienation is not suspended.
Under the third section, trusts may be created:"To
receive the rents and profits of land and apply them to

the use of any person auring the life of such person, or
for any shorter term, subject to the rules prescribed in
the

first article of this title.*

It is

further provided

in the statute of uses and trusts, that where
is or shall be expressed in the

the trust

instrument creating the es-

tate, every sale or conveyance by the trustee

in contra-

vention of the trust shall be void; and that a beneficiary for the receipt of rents and profits cannot assign
or dispose of such interest.

Therefore, the statute makes

the estate inalienable, and also expressly subject to the
rules against suspension.

So it becomes very necessary to

determine whether a trust comes under the second or third
section, and the courts have decided that where a trustee
is directed to receive the rents and profits and apply
pay them over,

such trust belongs

to the

or

third class,

but where he is directed to pay a specific sum of money
assuch, and riot as rents and profits,

the trust belongs to

the second class.
And now as to the fourth and last purpose
trusts can be created:

that is,

I To receive

for which

the re its and

profits of land and to accumulate the same for the purpose,
and within the limits prescribed in the first article of

this act."

Article first provides in substance,

that accu-

mulations may be made for the benefit of one or more minors
then in being, and terminate

with their minority

If the

accumulation is to commence at any time after the creation
of the estate
arise;

it

out of which the rents and profits

shall commence within two

the minority of the persons

lives in

for whose benefit

are to
being,
it

is

and dbririg
direct-

ed, and shall terminate at the expiration of such minority.
There is an important distinction between accumulations of real and personal property, here to be noted.

In

the case of real property, accumulations for the benefit of
an unborn child may be directed to commence at the end of
two lives in being, at the birth of such child and extend
through his minority;
erty ,

but in the case of personal prop-

it must commence before

the expiration of the second

life, otherwise the provisions are the same.
Manice, 43 N. Y. 383.

( Manicev.

)

Every accumulatiom must be for the sole benefit
an i :ant and where it is for the purpose of paying a lump
sum legacy

the power of alienation is not suspended,

nevertheless, where the accumulation is to commence after

the creation of the estate,

alienation may be suspended

and the mileE already considered are to be applied in deternini i ig its

validity.

I will now consider the rules against perpetuitics,
as applied to powers.

It seems an anomaly to say , that

the power of alienation may be suspended by the creation
of a power, for if there is in fact a power in any body to
sell the property, it cannot be said that the power of
alierition is

wanting,

nevertheless,

such may be the case

where the power cannot be excercised mntil the expiration
of a certain time.

If the power can be exercised only at

a time beyond that within which all

limitations must take effect

in possession , namely, two lives in beimg, the power is
void; so also if

the power is special, and the appointment

is limited to a person or to persons none of whom can take
from being to remote under the rule, thus the power to
appoint among great- grandchildren of the testator. ( Dana
v. Murray, 122 N. Y. 613.)
Not only may the power of alienation be suspended
where there is a power

to sell land at a future day and

pay over the proceeds to pers~ns,who,cannot till then be
ascertaind ; but also where the direction is to pay the

proceeds to a trustee.
If

a trust is created which involves suspension,and

a power is given to the trustee to sell the land and thereby entirely free the proceeds from the operation of the
execution of the trust, the existence of the power must
obviate any suspension of the power of alienation,; but
if the proceeds of such sale are to remain subject to
the execution of the trust, then alienation id suspended. ( Brewer v. Brewer, 11 Hun, 147.)
The period during which the absolute power of alienation may be suspended by any instrument in execution of
a power is computed, not from the date of such instrument,
but from the time of the creation of the power.
Wffhere the execution of a power in trust

to sell

real estate is unlimited as to time, it is not for that
reason invalid; the mere possibility of an illegal appointment will not invalidate the power if it is in the end
properly exercised.

The rules governing the creation of

powers in real property are to be applied so far as applicable to po'ters concerning personal property, keeping in
nAnd, however, the distinction already considered between
suspension of power of alienation, and of absolute owner-

ship.

( Hutton v. Benkard, 92 N. Y. 295.)
The earlier deci sions of this State tended towards

holding perpetual trusts for charitable purposes valid.
The leading case was that of Williams v. Williams, ( 4 Sel'
484.)where it was held that the rule against perpetuitdes
in New York did not apply to gifts for a charitable purpose, Here the issue was

as to the validity of a bequest

to three persons, by name, directing the application of th_
fund to the education of the children of the poor in Huntington at the academy in that village.

It also contained

provisions for perserving a succession of trustees to
apply the fund, and was upheld as valid.

The decision did

not meet with favor from the courts, and was continually
distinguished, critized, and finally overruled in the case
of Bascomb v. Albertson,

(34 N. Y. 584.)

The court

,

after a most careful and exaustive research, decided that a
gift to a charitable use was subject to the rules against
perpetuities, and that in determining whether the viceof
perpetuity attaches, it is of no significance whatever
that the limitations are to what are anderstood

as char-

itable objects.
It has been the policy of this State, nevertheless,

to encourage gifts and legacies to legally incorporated societies organized for charitable purposes; but the law
has thrown around such institutions necessary and healthful
restrictions upon their taking and holding property

a

devise to a corporation is prohibited except in cases wher,_
by the law of its creation or some other la: of the State
the particular corporation is authorized to take by devise,
and corporations can only take and hold property to the
amounts an d for the purposes prescribed by their charters;
( in favor
to this extent each act of incorporation is a dispensation
of the particular corporation in respect to the prohibition
of the statutes against perpetuities.
I have refrained from going into this subject more
in detail as I regard a clear precise presentation as more
e
benficial and important than a more minute and voluminous
disquisition,and indeedthis is rendered unnecessary as the
so called doctrine of perpetuities is no longer an uncertain metaphysical policy, the fundamental principles being
governed by postive legislation. Most of the difficulties
hen
of the present day are in determining intention, and .this is once fixed upon, the application of the ri-es becomes -omparatively easy.

